The last sentence of my article on the neurobiological context of qualia is:

“Future neurobiological approaches might identify the neuronal processes involved in qualia and how they are involved, but it seems illusory to us [. to me] to explain the individual quale” (Korf, 2015).

Accordingly I do agree with Maung that the paper does not solve the “hard problem of Chalmers”. Instead, my article approaches it as a neurobiological problem, not as a (neuro) philosophical issue. My stance is that the brain is a complex and unique structure (or “configuration”) that enables the emergence of a subjective feeling of a mind, thereby ignoring substance dualism or panpsychism (Earp, 2012). Accordingly, a functioning brain is a personal universe, where-among other-cognitive and subjective feelings are intertwined.

This view might be illustrated by the fact that our behavior is often initiated (“or caused”) by cognitive processes: are these cognitive processes emerged from brain processes? Of course (Earp, 2012 and references therein)! If such processes are associated with subjective feelings, i.e. they are qualia: hence a brain process. We do (obviously) not feel brain-processes but only the cognitive and subjective additives (qualia). And because they are brain processes they can be described as logical formalities: as spatial and temporal extensions and processes. But these are not necessarily localized as or directly associated with currently known entities or elements. I followed Searle and compared consciousness (and qualia) with liquidity (as related to water molecules); but this metaphor might be inadequate: liquidity is a property experienced by an observer. As such, liquidity does not cause neurons to react or molecules to move. In this respect, qualia are the opposite: they activate or are associated with nervous activities. Just as in physics by the exploration of elementary particles, dedicated neurobiological exploration might provide new conceptualizations of qualia.

REFERENCES